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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

NOTES AND COMMENTS

RUNNING AFOUL OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT:
EXPEDITED REMOVAL UNDER THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
REFORM AND IMMIGRANT RESPONSIBILITY ACT

“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion.”1

I. INTRODUCTION
While the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 (hereinafter “IIRIRA”)2 brought about some of the most calculated and
sweeping changes in the immigration laws of the United States in recent
decades,3 the procedures established for the summary removal of certain
arriving immigrants are among the most severe in effect. Under IIRIRA,
persons who arrive in the U.S. with documentation “determined” by the
inspecting immigration official to be insufficient or to have been procured by
fraud are subject to “expedited removal” from the United States by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (I.N.S.).4 Too often, however, the

1. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, July 28, 1951, Art. 33, 189
U.N.T.S. 137, 176 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. The neartotality of the provisions of that Convention, including Article 33, were incorporated by reference
into the U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, New York, January 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, (entered into force October 4, 1967.) The Protocol, which the United
States signed in 1968, removed the time and geographical limitations of the term “refugee.”
2. Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009 (Codified in various sections of Title 8 of
the U.S. Code). The provisions of IIRIRA discussed herein went into effect on April 1, 1997.
3. The last comprehensive overhaul of the Immigration and Nationality Act is considered to
have been the Immigration Act of 1952.
4. Under IIRIRA, an arriving alien who is found to be inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(a)(6)(C) (1998) (for seeking admission by fraud or willful misrepresentation) or under 8 U.S.C. §
1182 (a)(7)(A) (for lack of valid documents for admission at the time entry to the United States is
sought) is subject to expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(1) (1998).
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inspection mechanisms established by IIRIRA fail to account for the
circumstances that caused a particular immigrant to arrive in the U.S. in the
first place. Indeed, the procedures set up under IIRIRA for determining an
arriving immigrant’s eligibility for political asylum do not provide adequate
guarantees against “non-refoulement” of refugees as required of the U.S. by
international law.
Until the advent of IIRIRA, the Immigration and Nationality Act contained
measures that were designed to protect refugees. IIRIRA creates the
possibility that individuals who meet the criteria for the basic protection of
non-refoulement will nevertheless be summarily removed from the U.S. and
returned to their country of origin. IIRIRA requires the application of
standards more strict than those prescribed by international law for making
eligibility determinations for refugee protections. IIRIRA transgresses the
norms of international refugee law by allowing for the possibility that an
arriving immigrant who meets the lower threshold prescribed by international
law to be returned to his or her country of origin,.5
The importance of non-refoulement cannot and indeed, under IIRIRA, will
not often be told by persons who benefited from the protection IIRIRA
pretends to offer. As it now stands, the consequences of expedited removal lie
with those who have been removed to places from which they may never
return to speak of its failings. Beneath the relegation of what has for so long
been regarded as “the Golden Door”6 to the status of a mere ‘revolving door’
are violations of international law perpetrated by I.N.S. officials each day at
ports of entry into the United States.
I.N.S. inspectors at ports of entry are now empowered to make
determinations so crucial that the life of the immigrant seeking admission often
hangs in the balance. If an arriving immigrant who is thought to lack proper
entry documents does not express— to the satisfaction of the inspecting
officer—(who are often overworked and largely untrained in asylum law) a
“credible fear” of returning to his or her country of origin, he or she may be
placed on the next plane bound for the very country he or she has fled.7 It is all

5. Carolyn Patty Blum, A Question of Values: Continuing Divergences Between U.S. and
International Refugee Norms, 15 BERK. J. INT’L LAW 38, 48 (1997). “[T]he appropriate
screening standard for asylum seekers at the border is whether their claims are ‘manifestly
unfounded,’ a standard requiring far less proof than the United States’ credible fear of
persecution.” (Citing the position of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) as expressed in UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No. 30 (1983)).
6. Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus 1, (1888).
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(1)(A)(i) (1996) states “the officer shall order the alien removed from
the United States without further hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an intention to
apply for asylum under section 208 [8 U.S.C. § 1158] or a fear of persecution.”
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the more disconcerting, then, that the decision of such inspecting officials to
admit or exclude an immigrant is not subject to judicial review.8
By failing to ensure adequate means within the inspection process for
identifying and giving meaningful notice of the protections available to
persons who meet the international definition of “refugee”, the Immigration
and Nationality Act as amended by IIRIRA violates both U.S. obligations
under international treaties as well as peremptory norms of international law.
Specifically, the obligation to honor the principle of “non-refoulement”9 is
jeopardized severely by the limited access IIRIRA affords to the asylum
mechanisms of U.S. immigration law. Further, many of the changes wrought
by IIRIRA reverse any progress towards bringing U.S. domestic refugee law
into line with international law in that same area.10 This comment will set
forth the removal procedures instituted by IIRIRA and illustrate the manner in
which they contravene U.S. obligations under international law. It will
ultimately examine the difficulties associated with bringing international law to
bear in U.S. courts in a potential challenge to some of the most severe
provisions of IIRIRA as they relating to non-refoulement.
II. IIRIRA: A NEW IMMIGRATION REGIME
A.

Admissibility under IIRIRA

Under the inspection process for persons arriving in the United States as
established by IIRIRA, one who has not yet entered the United States is
considered to be an “applicant for admission.”11 Admissibility may be
established by showing proof of U.S. citizenship, lawful permanent residency,
or other similar status or by presenting a valid visa obtained abroad.12 Noncitizens who possess facially valid entry documents may nonetheless be
deemed inadmissible for any number of reasons, including having committed
fraud in obtaining their visa, as a result of prior criminal convictions, or

8. See Id. and 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(2)(A) (1998) (disallowing judicial review of any action
taken in the context of expedited removal.)
9. The principle of non-refoulement is set forth in Article 33 of the U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees. (See note 1, supra.) This principle was incorporated into U.S.
law at 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (b)(3) (1980).
10. The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, was enacted with the objective of
bringing U.S. law into accordance with the provisions of the U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees. See S. CONF. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1980).
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (a)(1) (1996) states “An alien present in the United States who has not
been admitted or who arrives in the United States shall be deemed for purposes of this Act an
applicant for admission.”
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1181 (1998).
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pursuant to a previous order of deportation or removal.13 The forum in which
the admissibility of different categories of applicants is determined varies.14
The new threshold determination of whether an immigrant has been
“admitted” does away with the prior concept of “entry” into the U.S. 15 The
change, however, extends well beyond the difference in the term of art used.
Under the previous legal regime, if an I.N.S. inspector felt an applicant for
admission should be excluded from the U.S., the person was referred for an
evidentiary hearing held before an immigration judge. Thus, to the extent that
the decision rendered in the initial administrative procedure was adverse to the
immigrant, a judicial procedure followed. The decision of an immigration
judge made in exclusion proceedings was then subject to review by the Board
of Immigration Appeals and the Federal District Courts. IIRIRA, on the other
hand, authorizes the Attorney General to treat even persons who have not been
admitted and are subsequently found within the United States in the same
manner as arriving immigrants.16
Under the system established by IIRIRA, the availability of procedural
safeguards against the return of bona fide refugees is severely limited, both by
“restrict[ing] access to the adjudication system at the front end” and also
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1998).
14. Most determinations of admissibility are made by consular officers overseas during the
visa application process, but similar determinations are made by the inspecting immigration
officials at the port of entry. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3) (1998). Limited habeas corpus review is
available to persons claiming to be U.S. citizens or who claim to have been previously admitted
to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident, refugee or asylee. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3 (b)(5)(iv) (1998).
Such determinations, however, are limited to determining whether or not the person making such
a claim possesses the status asserted. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) (1998).
15. Under the I.N.A. prior to IIRIRA, one who had entered the U.S. but who could not
establish the legal manner in which they did so was placed in deportation proceedings and
ordered to show cause why they should not be deported. Conversely, one seeking to enter the
U.S. was placed in exclusion proceedings, where they were required to show their eligibility for
entry into the U.S. The legal fiction of the “entry” doctrine created the possibility of a person
being present in the U.S. without having “entered.” Under IIRIRA, persons found within the U.S.
who have not been “admitted” are deemed to be “unlawfully present” and are subject to removal
proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(6)(A).
16. Lawyer’s Committee for Human Rights, SLAMMING “THE GOLDEN DOOR”: A YEAR OF
EXPEDITED REMOVAL 4 (March, 1998) [hereinafter “SLAMMING ‘THE GOLDEN DOOR’”]. In spite
of being so authorized, the Attorney General has stated that the provisions of expedited removal
will only be applied to “arriving aliens,” as “application of the expedited removal provisions to
aliens already in the United States will involve more complex determinations of fact and will be
more difficult to manage.” The Department of Justice, has however, reserved the right to apply
these provisions at any time and in any particular situation. Inspection and Expedited Removal of
Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures,
62 Fed. Reg. 10, 312-313 (1997). The Department of Justice subsequently announced in
September, 1999 that the I.N.S. will begin to apply expedited removal to certain criminal aliens in
three correctional facilities in the State of Texas on a trial basis for 180 days. 64 Fed. Reg. 51338
(1999).
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through the use of “court-stripping provisions [that] virtually eliminate judicial
review at the back end.”17 The former problem arises during the initial
inspection process upon arrival into the U.S. IIRIRA did not change the
structure of this inspection process.
B.

Inspection and Removal

The use of a two-tiered inspection system whereby persons who are not
immediately found to be admissible by the primary I.N.S. inspector are
referred for “secondary inspection” is not a new process. Prior to IIRIRA, a
secondary inspector who found a person to be excludable due to a lack of
proper entry documents would place him or her in exclusion proceedings.
Under IIRIRA, the same official may summarily exclude and simultaneously
order the removal of a similarly situated immigrant to his or her country of
origin. This process, dubbed “expedited removal,” has created many disturbing
scenarios involving would-be asylum seekers, and leaves open the possibility
of many more. What would previously have been a decision that could have
been appealed to administrative and judicial authorities is reduced now to a
unilateral decision that is subject to the review of a supervisory I.N.S.
inspector, and, if requested by the immigrant, an immigration judge.
The consequences of the determinations that will now be made by a
secondary inspector now greatly exceed the authority previously bestowed
upon these lower-level officials. It must be noted that I.N.S. inspectors making
such determinations will not receive training comparable to that received by
the asylum officers18 previously charged with making such determinations in
the case of affirmative asylum applications.19
A provision of the Act enables persons seeking admission to withdraw
their application in order to avoid the five year bar to re-entry that accompanies
an order of expedited removal.20 Such a provision is of no consolation,
17. SLAMMING “THE GOLDEN DOOR” supra note 16, at 4.
18. Asylum officer, as defined by statute, is an immigration officer who—
(i)
has had professional training in country conditions, asylum law, and interview
techniques comparable to that provided to full-time adjudicators of applications
under section 208 [8 U.S.C. §1158], and
(ii)
is supervised by an officer who meets the condition described in clause (i) and
has had substantial experience adjudicating asylum applications.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(E)(i & ii) (1998).
19. While I.N.S. inspectors must successfully complete “a 14-week basic training program
and a one-year field training and probationary period,”asylum officers receive training in “asylum
law, current country conditions and interviewing skills, including techniques for interviewing
individuals who may be survivors of torture. After initial training, asylum officers continue to
receive ongoing training in these areas.” U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of
Public Affairs, FY 1998 Update on Expedited Removals, (June 21, 1999) <http://www.ins.usdoj.
gov/graphics/publicaffairs/factsheets/Expedite.htm>.
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4) (1998).
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however, to individuals whose arrival in the U.S. came as a result of
persecution in their homeland.21 Further, the right to withdraw an application
for admission is not automatic.22
The use of expedited removal is limited to applicants for admission who
either lack any documents entitling them to admission or whose documents
appear to have been obtained by fraud.23 Nevertheless, the circumstances
surrounding the departure of many would-be asylum seekers from their
country of origin are such that they may not have been able to acquire the
proper documents for admission to the U.S.24 It is for this reason that the
process of expedited removal is most likely to place asylum-seekers at risk.
By virtue of arriving in the U.S. without proper entry documents or with
falsified documents used solely to escape the country in which they faced
persecution, these individuals are subject to the most harsh treatment available
under U.S. immigration law: removal without a hearing by an administrative or
judicial official and a five year bar against re-entering the country.
Implicit in this harsh treatment of persons with falsified or inadequate
documentation is the presumption that they are less likely to be genuine
refugees than those aliens who may be in possession of a U.S. visa. In fact,
given the urgency of the circumstances prompting the departure of most
refugees from their homeland, the contrary would seem to hold true.
Nevertheless, refugees arriving without a U.S. visa are singled out for adverse
treatment without the safeguards needed to make an adequate determination as
to the reason(s) for their lack of proper documentation.
The unavailability of judicial review of the determinations made by I.N.S.
inspectors may be attributed in part to the long standing premise that “physical
presence is not necessarily synonymous with legal presence for the purposes of
determining constitutional guarantees.”25 IIRIRA goes one step further,
however, by eliminating the possibility of admissibility determinations being
made in the context of exclusion proceedings before an immigration judge.
Absent such substantive procedural review by a judge, the secondary
inspection procedure proves to be entirely dispositive of a refugee’s ability to

21. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (a)(4), an alien may withdraw his application for admission at the
discretion of the inspecting officer, and depart immediately from the U.S.
22. Permission to withdraw an application for admission is granted at the discretion of the
inspecting officer. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4). If the inspectors find no deliberate fraudulent intent or
other serious violation, the individuals are generally allowed to withdraw their application for
admission and depart the United States. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of
Public Affairs, FY 1998 Update on Expedited Removals, (June 21, 1999) supra note 19.
23. See supra note 4.
24. “Refugees who flee frequently have no time for immigration formalities, and allowance
for this is contained in Article 31 of the Convention [Relating to the Status of Refugees].” GUY S.
GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 152 (2d ed.1996).
25. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 24, at 145.
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receive the protection required by international law. The introduction of the
summarily harsh “expedited removal” procedure is difficult to square with the
long standing principle of non-refoulement—a landmark of international
refugee law which the United States adopted many years ago.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT
A.

The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its
Protocol

The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951
provides for refugee protection from expulsion or return (“refoulement”) to a
country where “his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.”26 Both the requirement of non-expulsion and that of non-return
(“non-refoulement”) have received significant attention, focused largely upon
the distinction that may exist between these two terms.27 The significance of
the terms stems from the fact that as their interpretation varies, so too may the
responsibility of a State towards a refugee.
The term “expel” connotes a refugee’s presence within a State in the first
place. Since the Convention does not require a State to offer admission to a
refugee,28 it is not entirely clear what responsibility a State has to an arriving
refugee. However, the Convention prohibits States from returning refugees “in
any manner whatsoever” to a land where “his life or freedom would be
threatened.”29 This restriction sets Article 33(1) apart from other provisions of
the Convention in that it is not conditioned upon “degrees of presence and
lawful residence.”30 In fact, it may be considered demonstrative of the intent
for Article 33 to be interpreted in light of Article 31, which guarantees the
application of the Convention to refugees regardless of the illegality of their
entry or presence.31
With the term “non-refoulement” being added to the Convention, it seems
more clear that the prohibition against the return of a refugee would include the

26. Refugee Convention, supra note 1, Art. 33.
27. For more in-depth discussion of the various interpretations of these terms as used in the
Convention, see Elwin Griffith, Problems of Interpretation in Asylum and Withholding of
Deportation Proceedings Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 18 LOY. L.A. INT’L &
COMP. L.J. 255, 275-282 (1996).
28. The absence of such a requirement has been found to be a “major drawback” to the nonrefoulement requirement in that it does not preclude temporary protection policies. See Joan
Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 229, 237-39 (1996).
29. Refugee Convention, supra note 1, Art. 33.
30. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 24, at 142
31. Refugee Convention, supra note 1, at Art. 31, sec. 1 and Art. 33, sec. 1.
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return of one who is seeking admission.32 Even the U.S. Supreme Court in
Sale, Acting Commissioner, INS v. Haitian Centers Council seemed to
acknowledge that aliens who reach ports of entry are protected by both the
1951 Convention (Art. 33) as well as the U.S. statute.33 Indeed, “if States
avoid the mandate of Article 33 by arguing that the refugees are outside their
borders, they dilute the meaning of “return. . .in any manner whatsoever.”34
To allow a contrary reading of this Article would be to say “the extent to which
a refugee is protected – in accordance with the humanitarian aim of the
Convention – against return to a country in which he fears persecution would
depend upon the fortuitous circumstance whether he has succeeded in
penetrating the territory of a contracting State.”35 For this reason, the
interpretation of Article 33 that imposes two requirements: that of nonexpulsion and of non-return (non-refoulement) provides a more clear notion of
the intent of the Convention as it relates to the obligations of the party States.36
It is this very interpretation that was advanced by the Executive Committee of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), when it
reaffirmed “the fundamental importance of the observance of the principle of
non-refoulement . . . irrespective of whether or not [individuals] have been
formally recognized as refugees.”37
B.

Non-refoulement as a Norm of International Law

Aside from creating an obligation for signatory States to the Refugee
Convention and the 1967 Protocol, the principle of non-refoulement can be
said to have risen to the level of a binding norm of international law, if one that
contains some exceptions.38 Touted as “the most enduring contribution of the
Convention,” the development of this norm “beyond the bounds of the

32. The French term “refouler” is most generally associated with the notion of refusing entry
at the border. Griffith, supra note 27, at 276. The inclusion of both the term return and refouler
in the Convention may be best attributed to the variance among the procedures for admission of
persons to individual party States. Indeed, the issue of non-refoulement would not be an issue in
a State where procedures were limited to expulsion and deportation as opposed to refusal of
admission. Id. at 277, n. 113.
33. 509 U.S. 155, 182, 113 S.Ct. 2549, 2564 (1993).
34. Refugee Convention, supra note 1, (quoted in Griffith, supra note 27, at 280).
35. Paul Weis, Territorial Asylum, 6 IJIL 1966, 173, 183, (quoted in GUNNEL STENBERG,
NON-EXPULSION AND NON-REFOULEMENT, 176 (1989)).
36. “The expulsion restriction prohibits the removal of an alien from a contracting State,
whereas the “return” restriction prohibits the return of an alien at or outside of the border back to
the place of danger.” Griffith, supra note 27. In support of this position, Griffith cites GOODWINGILL, supra note 18, wherein he establishes that “Refoulement is directed to the [category of
refugees unlawfully within or outside a State’s territory.]” Griffith, supra note 22 at 279, n. 127.
37. Conclusion Endorsed by the Executive Committee on Non-refoulement, U.N. GAOR,
32nd Session, Supp. No. 12A, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/32/12/Add.1 (1977).
38. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 24, at 167.
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Convention” is of tremendous significance in that it creates a requirement even
for States that are not parties to either the Convention or the Protocol.39 The
“crystallization” of the principle of non-refoulement into a customary norm is a
process that has been traced by the UNHCR Executive Committee in its annual
Conclusions.40 In 1981, the ExComm urged that even in situations involving a
mass influx, “the fundamental principle of non-refoulement—including nonrejection at the frontier—must be scrupulously observed.”41 The following
year, the Committee noted that non-refoulement was “progressively acquiring
the character of a peremptory rule of international law.”42 While the
conclusions of the Executive Committee do not create binding obligations,
they constitute a contribution to the opinio juris of States.43 When coupled
with consistent State practice, the opinio juris can be said to have given rise to
jus cogens—a peremptory norm. This notion was reinforced when the
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees was issued in 1984, declaring nonrefoulement to be “a corner-stone of the international protection of refugees”
that should be acknowleged and observed as a rule of jus cogens.44 State
practice has confirmed that “the duty of nonrefoulement extends beyond
expulsion and return and applies to measures such as rejection at the
frontier.”45
Evidence of State practice which conforms with the principle of nonrefoulement may be found in subsequent international agreements which
specifically refer to it. One such agreement is the United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.46 This Convention incorporates the principle of non-refoulement
and applies it to persons who would face torture if returned to their country of
origin. Specifically, Article 3, paragraph 1 of that Convention requires that
“no State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite (in the case of an
immigrant already present in the country) a person to another State where there
39. Fitzpatrick, supra note 28, at 252.
40. Executive Committee Conclusion No. 22 U.N. GAOR, 36th Session, Supp. No. 12A at
18, U.N. Doc. A/36/12/Add.1 (1981).
41. Id.
42. Report of the 33rd Session: U.N. doc. A/AC.96/614, para. 70 (1982) (cited in GOODWINGILL, supra note 24, at 127).
43. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 24, at 128.
44. 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Nov. 22, 1984, reprinted in Annual Report of
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66/doc.10, rev. 1
(1984-85) (quoted in PIRKKO KOURULA, BROADENING THE EDGES: REFUGEE DEFINITION AND
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION REVISITED 276 (1997)).
45. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Nonrefoulement and the New Asylum Seekers, in THE NEW
ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW IN THE 1980S THE NINTH SOKOL COLLOQUIUM ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 103, 105 (David A. Martin, ed. 1986).
46. Opened for signature February 4, 1984, G.A. res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. NO. 51,
at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) [hereinafter “Convention Against Torture”].
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are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture.”47
The Convention Against Torture’s use of language paralleling that of the
Refugee Convention while further recognizing the need for protection of
persons already present in the country seeking to remove them lends further
credence to the notion that non-refoulement has risen to the level of a
customary norm of international law. At the same time, it creates an additional
class of persons who may not be subjected to return or rejection at the border
of a state where they seek refuge.
IV. CLARIFYING THE OBLIGATIONS OF NON-REFOULEMENT
A.

The Duty of States: Protection, Not Admission

A significant part of the debate surrounding the principle of nonrefoulement stems from the fact that States have attempted to blur the
responsibilities that the principle creates for them. States have attempted to
shift the focus away from the risks faced by refugees who may be forcibly
returned to their country of origin, instead focusing on the prospect of a mass
influx of immigrants. The concern surrounding a potential mass migration into
a State is certainly not without basis. The fact remains, however, that States,
especially those which are signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention or the
1967 Protocol, are duty bound not to forcibly return (‘refouler’) or otherwise
reject persons arriving at its borders who have either a well-founded fear of
persecution or who have grounds for believing that a danger of torture exists if
returned to their home country.48 Indeed, “[t]he application of the principle of
nonrefoulement is independent of any formal determination of refugee status
by a state or an international organization”49 making it applicable “as soon as
certain objective conditions occur.”50 In this manner,
a state may be liable for a breach of the duty of nonrefoulement regardless of
notions of fault, either directly for the acts and omissions of its officials, or
indirectly where its legal and administrative systems fail to provide a remedy
or guarantee which is required by an applicable international standard.51

47. Id. Art. 3, para. 1.
48. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 24, at 139.
49. Goodwin-Gill, Nonrefoulement and the New Asylum Seekers, supra note 45, at 105
(citing the Report of the UNHCR, paras. 22-23, U.N. Doc. E/1985/62 (1985); Report of the
Twenty-eighth session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme,
para. 53 (4)(c), U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/549 (1977)).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 105-06.
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Based upon the enactment of IIRIRA and the manner in which it has been
implemented, the United States may be said to have breached its duty under
international law on both counts.
B.

The Problem with U.S. Policy: Splitting Hairs to Avoid Its Obligation

Acknowledging the concern of States with the prospect of mass migration,
it is important to clarify the duty owed to arriving refugees. In fact, the
principle of non-refoulement does not require a State to admit or grant asylum
to a refugee. It does, however, “enjoin any action on the part of a state which
returns or has the effect of returning refugees to territories where their lives or
freedom may be threatened.”52 While the ultimate effect of non-refoulement
may require temporary refuge, “[i]t is a mistake to make the leap from
nonrefoulement to asylum.”53 It is in this respect that the United States failed
during the Haitian refugee crisis, as it blurred the line between admitting
refugees and not returning them to their country of origin. In a carefully
worded statement to the United Nations, the United States defended itself as
follows: “[the U.S.] did not consider that the non-refoulement obligation under
Article 33 of the Convention included an obligation to admit an asylum
seeker.”54 Even if this assertion is true, it does not serve to excuse the U.S.
from the obligation of non-refoulement. By appealing to the lack of an
obligation to provide asylum, the U.S. “failed to notice that non-refoulement is
not so much about admission to a State, as about not returning refugees to
where their lives or freedom may be endangered.”55 Expedited removal may
well have been conceived as a means of circumventing this very dilemma. The
distinction between non-refoulement and admission may become somewhat
blurred in cases where no third country will accept a genuine refugee arriving
at a U.S. port of entry. Such a dilemma does not, however, undermine the U.S.
obligation of non-refoulement.
States undermine the most fundamental basis of non-refoulement by
placing short-term national interests above a potential threat to the life or
freedom of refugees. Any fear that refugees may remain in a State does not
mitigate that State’s duty not to return them to their country of origin in those
situations:
the variety of procedural limitations governing applications for refugee status
and asylum, as well as the tendency of States to interpret their own and other
States’ duties in the light of sovereign self-interest, all contribute to a negative

52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. at 112.
GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 24, at 132.
Id.
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situation potentially capable of leading to breach of the fundamental principle
of non-refoulement.56

The tendency of U.S. courts and lawmakers alike to find a lack of standing
or of substantive rights for arriving immigrants demonstrates all the more the
need for compliance with international norms of non-refoulement. The duty of
the United States under international law not to return or to reject refugees
exists independent of the rights of any individual.57 The United States has
effectively shirked its responsibility to refugees by confusing the lack of
individual rights with a lack of a duty towards the refugees themselves. The
expedited removal provisions of IIRIRA are an unfortunate product of this
confusion, and their continued enforcement carries with it a significant risk
that individuals arriving in the United States will be forcibly returned to the
risk having their basic human rights violated.
V. U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW IN LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
A.

Reconciling U.S. Law with Treaty Obligations: The Refugee Act of 1980

While the United States was not a party to the original Convention of
1951, it ultimately signed the subsequent Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees in 1967.58 Prior to that time, nothing in U.S. law provided absolute
protection from refoulement (forcible return).59 The Protocol became effective
for the United States on November 1, 1968,60 but adherence to the principle of
non-refoulement remained discretionary until Congress passed the Refugee Act
of 198061 making the U.S. compliant with the requirements imposed upon it as
a signatory State.62 By attending to such fundamental details as introducing a
definition of a refugee into U.S. law,63 the Refugee Act began to provide a
56. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Protection of Refugees and the Safe Third Country Rule in
International Law, in ASYLUM LAW 89, 91 (Judicial Conference on Asylum Law ed., 1995).
57. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 24, at 171.
58. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 1. The Protocol
incorporated by reference all but the first Article of the Convention (limiting its application to
persons who were made refugees by events occurring prior to January 1, 1951) and provided for a
prospective application thereof. Id. Art. I, §§ 1 and 2.
59. GIL LOESCHER, BEYOND CHARITY: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND THE GLOBAL
REFUGEE CRISIS 58, n. 5 (1993).
60. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 1.
61. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 8
U.S.C.).
62. Maureen O’Connor-Hurley, The Asylum Process: Past, Present and Future, 26 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 995, 1006 (1992) (quoted in Mary McGee Light, Note: The Well-Founded Fear
Standard in Refugee Asylum: Will it Still Provide Hope for the Oppressed? 45 DRAKE L. REV.
789, 792 n. 36 (1997)).
63. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A) defines a refugee as “any person who is outside of any
country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside
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legal mechanism through which refugees could seek protection in the United
States.64 New provisions allowed for grants of asylum on a discretionary basis
for persons who met the refugee definition.65
One of the more notable inclusions in the Refugee Act was the mandatory
prohibition of the return of an alien to his or her country of origin if his or her
life or freedom would be endangered.66 The “withholding of deportation”
provision was duplicative of a type of relief already available through asylum
provisions. Its inclusion in U.S. law represented an important advance in that
it codified the requirement of non-refoulement into the domestic law of the
U.S. In this manner, the U.S. fulfilled the obligation imposed upon it by virtue
of it being a signatory to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees.67
B.

U.S. Obligations Under the Convention Against Torture

The United States became a signatory to the Convention Against Torture in
October, 1988 and it entered into force in November, 1994.68 On October 21,
1998, Congress enacted legislation requiring “heads of appropriate agencies
[to] prescribe regulations to implement the obligations of the United States
Under Article 3 of the [Convention Against Torture].”69 Pursuant to this
directive, the I.N.S. promulgated regulations establishing procedures for
raising a claim for protection from torture.70 In the context of expedited
removal, a person making an Article 3 claim undergoes the same “credible
fear” screening as an asylum-seeker, with the exception that once he is before
an immigration judge, he may assert a claim to withholding of removal or

any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return
to, and who is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”
64. McGee Light, supra note 62 at 793.
65. Id.
66. Originally codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (h) (“Withholding of Deportation”) and now
found at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3) (“Restriction on Removal”). Withholding of deportation was
previously discretionary, but under the Refugee Act of 1980 was made mandatory, in addition to
including provisions designed to prevent persecutors and criminals from benefiting from its
protection.
67. The provision for the “withholding of deportation” of certain aliens based upon
endangerment in his country of origin “is based directly upon the language of the Protocol and it
is intended that it be construed consistent with the Protocol.” H.R. CONF. REP. 96-781 (1980),
reprinted in U.S.C.A.A.N. 160, 161 (1980).
68. Convention Against Torture, supra note 46.
69. Section 2242(b) of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 Pub. L.
No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).
70. 64 Fed. Reg. 8478 (1999).
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deferral of removal in addition to the possibility of seeking asylum.71
Nevertheless, in order for Article 3 claims under the Convention Against
Torture to be heard, the applicants must overcome the obstacle of secondary
inspection. As a result, the risk of refoulement remains.
C. Treatment of Asylum-Seekers Under IIRIRA
Within the context of the inspection process, IIRIRA includes measures
directed at immigrants who may be eligible for political asylum in the U.S.72
Under these provisions, if an immigrant who is otherwise subject to expedited
removal expresses either a desire to apply for asylum or expresses a fear of
persecution, the I.N.S. inspector is required by law to refer them to an asylum
officer73 for an interview.74 Any such referral would take place during the
secondary stage of inspection. If the I.N.S. official fails, for whatever reason,
to ascertain that the “applicant for admission” has a credible fear of returning
to his country of origin, the immigrant is subject to expedited removal and left
without any recourse for review of the decision.
Advocates of expedited removal view cite to the high percentage of
immigrants found to have a “credible fear” in the course of their interview with
an asylum officer75 as evidence of an effective, comprehensive screening
process. Quite obviously, these numbers do not account for the individuals
who were not referred from secondary inspection for an interview with an
asylum officer due to an adverse determination by the I.N.S. officer conducting
the inspection. The shortcomings of the expedited removal process are best
illustrated then, by a closer examination of the secondary inspection process as
it relates to asylum-seekers.
VI. IIRIRA AND NON-REFOULEMENT: A TEST OF COMPATIBILITY
A.

Secondary Inspection: The Moment of Truth

For immigrants subject to expedited removal, secondary inspection
represents the crucial moment in which any fear of returning to their country
must emerge if they are to avoid summary repatriation. An immigrant ordered
71. Id. at 8484.
72. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 (b)(1)(A)(ii) and (b)(1)(B) et seq. (1996) provide procedures for the
inspection of persons asserting an asylum claim.
73. An asylum officer is defined as “an immigration officer who has had professional
training in country conditions, asylum law, and interview techniques comparable to that provided
to full-time adjudicators of [asylum] applications. . .and has had substantial experience
adjudicating asylum applications.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(1)(E).
74. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(1)(A)(ii).
75. Bo Cooper, Procedures for Expedited Removal and Asylum Screening Under the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. 29 CONN. L. REV. 1501, 1523
(1997).
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removed after secondary inspection is preempted from an interview with an
asylum officer.76 It is for this reason that the same guarantees afforded to those
who undergo a “credible fear” interview must be afforded to individuals in
secondary inspection. The failure to provide information regarding the
secondary inspection process and the availability of protections for refugees in
a manner that is meaningful to the immigrant (in his or her own language)
could result in his or her removal. It is not surprising, then, that the concerns
that have been raised regarding the conduct of secondary inspections include:
I.N.S. failure to provide adequate information about the process, abusive
conduct of I.N.S. officials during secondary inspection, a lack of
confidentiality of the interview, and inadequate translation services.77
I.N.S. officials involved in the secondary phase of inspection are required
to observe certain procedures aimed at apprising immigrants of the nature of
the proceedings in which they find themselves.78 On the form used by the
I.N.S. in its interviews, however, no specific mention is made of the
availability of asylum.79 The applicable statute falls short of ensuring that
aliens eligible for asylum will be apprised of the availability of same: “[t]he
Attorney General shall provide information concerning the asylum
interview. . .to aliens who may be eligible.”80 The safeguards provided within
the context of expedited removal depend largely upon their being provided by
the I.N.S. inspector.
The inspector is required to inform the alien of the possibility of speaking
to another officer about any concern he may have regarding being returned to
his country of origin.81 The difference in the availability of review of the
asylum officer’s decision is not mentioned.82 There is, however, a series of
three questions to be asked of the alien to ascertain whether he or she has a fear
of returning to his or her country.83 According to a study conducted by the
General Accounting Office (GAO), inspectors failed to document asking at
least one of the three required questions between an estimated 1 and 18 percent

76. SLAMMING “THE GOLDEN DOOR”, supra note16, at 9.
77. Id. at 9-13.
78. Id. at 9.
79. Department of Justice, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Form I-867A/B,
“Record of Sworn Statement in Proceedings under Section 235 (b)(1) of the Act.”
80. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(1)(B)(iv).
81. Form I-867A, supra note 79.
82. Id.
83. The questions are: “[1.]Why did you leave your home country or country of last
residence? [2.] Do you have any fear or concern about being returned to your home country or
being removed from the United States? [3.] Would you be harmed if you returned to your home
country or country of last residence?” Department of Justice, Form I-867B, “Jurat for Record of
Sworn Statement in Proceedings under Section 235 (b)(1) of the Act.”
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of the time.84 Such practice represents a failure on the part of the I.N.S. to
adhere to its own stated procedure, under which “[n]o alien can be
expeditiously removed from the United States until they are read, and
acknowledge they understand, a sworn statement and asked three specific
questions concerning whether they have a concern or fear of being returned to
their home country.”85
Once an intent to apply for asylum or a fear of return has been indicated by
the alien, the regulations used by the I.N.S. require that officials “record
sufficient information . . . to establish . . . that the alien had indicated such
intention, fear, or concern.”86 This regulation seems to go beyond the statutory
indications for referral of aliens for an interview by an asylum officer.87 An
internal I.N.S. memorandum only exacerbates this by instructing the inspector
to “ask enough follow-up questions to ascertain the general nature of the fear
or concern.”88 Such instruction clearly exceeds the bounds of the role set forth
for inspectors, as “[t]he legislative scheme anticipates that false claims will be
identified by trained Asylum Officers at credible fear interviews—not by lowlevel inspectors at the airport.”89
In the context of expedited removal, any hope for a guarantee of protection
for refugees depends directly upon the integrity of the procedures established
and the adherence of immigration officials to the same. Since the I.N.S.
procedures have already been found to be lacking in specific respects, the
faithful adherence of officials to the few requirements that exist is all the more
crucial, as “[p]rocedural safeguards are of vital importance from the very first
moment that the examination of an asylum claim begins.”90
B.

Secondary Inspection and Minimum Guarantees of Non-refoulement

Defenders of the expedited removal procedures currently in place have
attempted to find support within international instruments for the abbreviated

84. United States General Accounting Office, Illegal Aliens: Changes in the Process of
Denying Aliens Entry Into the United States. GAO/GGD-98-81, 43 (March, 1998) [hereinafter
GAO Report].
85. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of Public Affairs, FY 1998 Update
on Expedited Removals, (June 21, 1999) supra note 19.
86. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3 (b)(4).
87. “If an immigration officer determines that an alien. . .who is arriving in the United
States. . . [is subject to expedited removal]. . .and the alien indicates either an intention to apply
for asylum. . .or a fear of persecution, the officer shall refer the alien for an interview with an
asylum officer. . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(1)(A)(ii). (emphasis added).
88. I.N.S. Memorandum re: Implementation of Expedited Removal, at para. 7 (Mar. 31,
1997) (quoted in SLAMMING “THE GOLDEN DOOR”, supra note 16, at 13).
89. SLAMMING “THE GOLDEN DOOR”, supra note 16, at 11.
90. Naula Mole, Background Note on Seeking Asylum and Administrative Procedures, in
ASYLUM LAW 143,147 (The Judicial Conference on Asylum Law ed., 1995).
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nature of the process.91 It should be noted that the United Nations document
most often cited in support of this position, the 1983 ExComm Conclusion No.
30, may well prove the contrary position. In fact, ExComm Conclusion No. 30
is premised upon the notion that applications for refugee status that would be
subject to an abbreviated procedure are those which are either “clearly
abusive” or “manifestly unfounded.”92 The actual determination as to whether
an application could be so categorized was considered to be one of
“substantive character.”93
Even within the context of an expeditious process, certain “procedural
guarantees” are still required.94 Because of the binding nature of the principle
of non-refoulement upon the U.S., “the integrity of the system of protection
[must] be assured; this entails the absence of arbitrariness, reasoned
determinations by trained and informed decision-makers, adequate
opportunities to present one’s case, including the assistance of appropriately
qualified interpreters, due process of law, coherence, and consistency.”95
The arguments that the expedited removal procedures provide these
guarantees are based upon a comparison with the interview by an asylum
officer rather than an interview conducted by the I.N.S. in a secondary
inspection.96 The secondary inspection interview falls far short of ensuring the
91. Cooper, supra note 75, at 1520-21. Cooper cites to the UNHCR, Executive Committee
Conclusion No. 30, The Problem of Manifestly Unfounded or Abusive Applications for Refugee
Status or Asylum, U.N. GAOR, 38th Session, Supp. No. 12A, at 23, U.N. Doc. A/38/12/ Add.1
(1983), Available at: <http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/unhcr/excom/exconc/excom30.htm>
[“ExComm Conclusion No. 30”]. While not directly binding on the U.S., the conclusions of the
Executive Committee represent recommendations of the consensus of its members, the U.S.
ranking among them.
92. Id. part (d).
93. Id. part (e).
94. In light of the “grave consequences of an erroneous determination [of refugee status]”
the recommended guarantees for an applicant for refugee status include:
(i)
. . . .a complete personal interview by a fully qualified official and whenever
possible, by an official of the authority competent to determine refugee status.
(ii)
[T]he manifestly unfounded or abusive character of an application should be
established by the authority normally competent to determine refugee status;
(iii)
[A]n unsuccessful applicant should be enabled to have a negative decision
reviewed before rejection at the frontier or forcible removal from the
territory. . .This review possibility can be more simplified than that available in
the case of rejected applications which are not considered manifestly
unfounded or abusive.
Ex Comm Conclusion No. 30, part (e), supra note 66.
95. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Principles of International Refugee Law, in ASYLUM 11, 23
(Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, ed. 1995).
96. “[T]he procedures in place for expedited removal—including instructions to inspectors,
notice of the process for asylum seekers, identification of adjudicators, contact with UNHCR, and
review with suspensive effect—appear to meet the requirements [of ExComm Conclusions Nos. 8
and 30].” Cooper, supra note 75 at 1521, n. 74.
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guarantees required for determining refugee status. Specifically, the secondary
inspector is allowed to determine that an application for refugee status is
“manifestly unfounded.”97 In such a case, the person making the application
may be subjected to an abbreviated review process.98 This procedure fails to
provide the second guarantee suggested by ExComm Conclusion No. 30, that
“[t]he manifestly unfounded or abusive character of an application should be
established by the authority normally competent to determine refugee status.”99
Within the context of expedited removal, it may be argued that the secondary
inspector is, de facto, the person who makes determinations of refugee status.
The preemptive effect of a decision not to refer applicants for an interview
with an asylum officer further demonstrates the pivotal nature of the secondary
inspection process and further evidences the need for increased review of the
secondary inspection process. The simple fact that secondary inspectors have
been empowered with additional discretion by IIRIRA cannot be considered an
adequate substitute for the competency required to make such determinations.
The I.N.S.’s assertion that “those people subject to the expedited removal
proceeding, experienced INS inspectors review their cases”100 is of little
consolation when one considers that even the credible fear determinations
made by experienced asylum officers are sometimes reversed.101
International human rights standards oblige States to ensure that those who
claim asylum have access to asylum determination procedures.102 In light of
the determinative nature of the secondary inspection process, it is of particular
importance that “airport immigration officials and even the lowest-ranking
border guards”103 understand the potential ramifications of their actions, both
for the refugee and the State that employs them.
ExComm Conclusion No. 30 also suggests a guarantee of review of an
adverse decision, even if in abbreviated form.104 While I.N.S. inspectors are
required to receive the approval of a supervisor prior to effectuating any order

97. ExComm Conclusion No. 30, part (d), supra note 91.
98. Id. at part (e)(iii) and (f).
99. Id. at part (e)(ii).
100. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of Public Affairs, FY 1998 Update
on Expedited Removals, (June 21, 1999) supra note 19.
101. Of 131 adverse credible fear decisions made by asylum officers, 12.4% were reversed by
an immigration judge. KAREN MUSALO, EXPEDITED REMOVAL STUDY, CENTER FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE SECOND YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION OF
EXPEDITED REMOVAL, Table 50. Immigration Judge Review Outcomes, EOIR Database (1999).
<http://www.uchasting.edu/ers/reports/1999/tables.pdf>
102. Mole, supra note 90, at 146.
103. Id.
104. ExComm Conclusion No. 30, supra note 91, part (e)(iii).
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of removal within the expedited removal context,105 an internal I.N.S. audit
found that 6 of 27 cases where an alien was ordered removed by the inspector
were not reviewed or approved by supervisors.106 Additionally, a review of
case files of similar orders revealed that documentation of supervisory review
was missing.107 Here again, the guarantees needed to protect refugees from
non-refoulement can only be effective if properly implemented, and even the
limited inquiry of the Government Accounting Office (GAO) reveals that the
I.N.S. has fallen short of doing so.108 When operating under an inspection
regime that provides abbreviated, if any, review of decisions, “[t]he underlying
practical issue is one of monitoring and compliance, but experience
unfortunately confirms that errors of refoulement are more likely when
procedural shortcuts are taken in zones of restricted guarantees and limited
access.”109
By virtue of the manner in which the inspection process is administered to
all arriving immigrants, including potential asylum seekers, the ports of entry
of the United States have become such a zone of restricted access. In fiscal
year 1998 alone, the I.N.S. reported that expedited removal accounted for
76,113 of the 115,143 non-criminal removals at ports of entry.110 The total
number of removals reflected an 82% increase over the previous fiscal year.111
During the fiscal year 1999, 89,035 aliensited removal, an increase of
approximately 16 percent over 1998 levels.112 As this number continues to
grow, so will the risk of refoulement of refugees.

105. “Any removal order entered by an examining immigration officer pursuant to [8 U.S.C.
§ 1225 (b)(1)] must be reviewed and approved by the appropriate supervisor before the order is
considered final.” 8 C.F.R. § 235.3 (b)(7).
106. GAO Report, supra note 84, at 44. (Citing the I.N.S. Office of Internal Audit, Final
Report Newark District (97-02, Jan. 5, 1998)).
107. Id.
108. The GAO failed to “undertake to evaluate the accuracy of decision-making in the
expedited removal process” in spite of the intent of Congress for it to do so. EXPEDITED
REMOVAL STUDY, supra note 101, III, A, ¶ 1. <http://www.uchasting.edu/ers/reports/1999/99ers
3.htm> (citing IIRAIRA, Appendix B (Requirement for Study and Report on Implementation of
Removal Procedures)).
109. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 24, at 147.
110. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of Public Affairs, INS Breaks
Previous Removals Record; Fiscal Year 1998 Removals Reach 171,154, (Jan. 8, 1999)
<http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/newsrels/remove98.htm>.
111. Id.
112. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of Public Affairs, INS Sets New
Removals Record; Fiscal Year 1999 Removals Reach 176,990, (Nov. 12, 1999), <http://www.ins.
usdoj.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/newsrels/removal99.pdf>
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C. “Credible Fear” Determinations
ExComm Conclusion No. 30 concludes that the standards of “manifestly
unfounded” and “abusive” are to be used in determining the viability of
applications for refugee status.113 Conspicuously absent is any reference to the
standard of “credible fear” utilized by asylum officers to determine if an
individual should undergo further screening for asylum in the U.S.114 No
standard of “credible fear” exists in the international context.115 While a lack
of a concrete definition in the international realm is not fatal, the prospect for
the development of one is dim. The marked difference between the “credible
fear” standard and that of “well-founded fear,” (which is used in determining
one’s eligibility for refugee status) is that there has been an opportunity for
judicial development of the latter standard.116 Such development is simply not
possible with the former standard, since, due to the procedural apparatus within
which it operates, there is no opportunity for the establishment of precedential,
binding decisions.117 This contrast is troubling for it leaves what have been
conceded to be “hair breadth judgments” in the hands of officers whose only
guidance comes from materials provided by the I.N.S.118 The concern, of
course, is that the “credible fear” standard will not be properly applied as a
lower screening standard than that used to determine one’s ultimate eligibility
for asylum that of a “well-founded fear of persecution.”
While the substance of the materials provided to asylum officers119 seems
to be properly aligned with the threshold for which it is instructing officers to
test, the concern again lies with how faithful the asylum officers will be to the
regulations provided. Without the review of their decisions on a level that will
develop precedent, the possibility of repetitive errors cannot be eliminated.
This problem has already been noted by at least one court. In AILA et. al.
v. Reno, the Court expressed concern over the limitation placed upon judicial
review, saying it was:

113. ExComm Conclusion No. 30, supra note 91.
114. “If the officer determines that the alien has a credible fear of persecution. . .the alien
shall be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.” 8 U.S.C. 1225 §
(b)(1)(B)(ii). “The term ‘credible fear of persecution’ means that there is a significant possibility,
taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien’s
claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for
asylum.” 8 U.S.C. 1225 § (b)(1)(B)(v).
115. Standard of “manifestly unfounded” requires a far lesser showing than that of “credible
fear of persecution.” Blum, supra note 5, at 48.
116. Cooper, supra note 91, at 1522.
117. “No prospect exists, therefore, for a body of jurisprudence on the credible fear standard.”
Id. at 1523.
118. Id. at 1503 and at 1523.
119. Here, reference is made to the I.N.S. “Credible Fear” Training Module as cited in
Cooper, supra note 91, at 1523.
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troubled by the effects of Congress’s decision to immunize the unwritten
actions of an agency from judicial review, particularly where. . .so much
discretion is placed in the hands of individual INS agents who face only a
supervisor’s review of their decisions.120

The Court went on to admonish the I.N.S. “in the strongest language possible”
to follow its own regulations in the treatment of aliens arriving in the United
States.121 While the recognition of the problem presented by the courtstripping measures of IIRIRA is welcome, the words of Judge Sullivan have a
somewhat hollow ring because IIRIRA renders them non-binding upon the
very agency to which they are directed. This frustration is endemic of similar
judicial challenges to IIRIRA.
One example of the magnitude of the risk for error in expedited removal
proceedings is set forth in the facts of Diaz v. Reno.122 Mr. Diaz, a U.S.
Citizen, entered the U.S. at O’Hare International Airport in Chicago on
February 18, 1998.123 In spite of his claim to citizenship and provision of
documents proving his status, Mr. Diaz was placed in expedited removal
proceedings and deported to Mexico without further hearing as required by 8
C.F.R. § 235.3. Stripped of his identity documents by the I.N.S., he was not
able to return to the U.S. until nearly three weeks later. In its decision, the
District Court found that Mr. Diaz’s substantive claim against the I.N.S. for
deportation in contravention of established procedure for processing U.S.
Citizens at a port of entry was moot.124 This left the I.N.S. without any
reprimand beyond that of a mandamus order to return Mr. Diaz’s identity
documents. While the indignity suffered by Mr. Diaz was certainly
substantial, some solace may be taken in the fact that he was ultimately able to
return to the U.S. The same cannot be said of refugees who fall victim to
similar errors on the part of I.N.S. inspectors. Whether a refugee is wrongly
sent away due to an inspector’s failure to follow established procedures, or
worse yet, failure to recognize the factors that trigger the possibility of a
“credible fear” interview, the principle of refoulement is equally violated.
VII. THE TREND OF IIRIRA: CAN IT BE STOPPED?
A.

Expedited Removal as a Policy of Non-Entrée

Unfortunately, the exclusionary features of IIRIRA in the United States
follow a pattern set by Western European nations relying upon such measures

120. 18 F. Supp. 2d 38, 58 (D.D.C. August 20, 1998) (Emmet G. Sullivan, U.S. District
Judge), aff’d by 199 F.3d 1352 (2000).
121. Id. at 64-65.
122. 40 F. Supp.2d 984 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
123. Id. at 985.
124. Id. at 987.
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as “safe country” lists and similar mechanisms to deny people access to an
asylum determination on the merits.125 An increasing proclivity on the part of
States to adopt policies of “non-entrée” indicates their intention to subvert
obligations towards refugees, including that of non-refoulement. Such policies
come in the form of increased visa requirements for nationals of countries
which produce a large number of refugees, sanctions on commercial carriers
for failure to detect fraudulent documents or for allowing the passage of
undocumented passengers, and even the forcible interdiction of entry of
refugees at frontiers.126 Whatever the mechanism, “[t]he simple purpose of
non-entrée strategies is to keep refugees away.”127 The purported objective of
doing so is to lessen the pressures placed upon States to accept such
immigrants, to avoid providing temporary refuge to the displaced,128 and to
avoid the costs of adjudication of claims and detention of refugees during the
pendency of same. The motivation to avoid such burdens has caused
“[d]eterrence [to] become official policy for a number of states.”129
While policies of non-entrée may not always prove to be directly violative
of the obligation of non-refoulement, the result for would-be refugees is, of
course, the same. It is for this reason that the actions of the United States
during the Haitian refugee crisis of the early 1990s have been the subject of
intense criticism. The interdiction and repatriation of Haitians following the
coup against the Aristide government was ordered by President Bush130 and
continued by the Clinton administration. The Supreme Court upheld the action
in Sale, Acting Commissioner, INS v. Haitian Centers Council, ruling that
“neither domestic law nor Article 33 of the 1951 Convention limited the power
of the President to order the Coast Guard to repatriate undocumented aliens,
including refugees, on the high seas.”131 The decision of the Court limited, in
effect, the obligations of non-refoulement to aliens who have arrived at a port
in the U.S.. Such treatment of international law by a domestic court is not
entirely uncommon, and presents an additional challenge.

125. For a discussion of the movement towards policies offensive to the 1951 Convention, see
Maryellen Fullerton, Restricting the Flow of Asylum-Seekers in Belgium, Denmark, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands: New Challenges to the Geneva Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and the European Convention on Human Rights. 29 VA.J.INT’L L. 33
(1988).
126. RECONCEIVING INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW xx (James C. Hathaway, ed. 1997).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. LOESCHER, supra note 59, at 144.
130. See Executive Order No. 12,807: 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992).
131. 509 U.S. 155, supra note 33.
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The Problem of Bringing International Law to Bear in U.S. Courts

In light of the seemingly obvious violations of customary norms of
international refugee law by the U.S., the need for redress is apparent. While
the Refugee Convention does not include a means to enforce its requirements
upon party States, the status of non-refoulement as a customary norm, let alone
its binding nature upon states through treaties, would appear to provide ample
fodder for a domestic court to take up the role of enforcing the same.132
Unfortunately, several cases dealing with non-refoulement have borne out an
inclination on the part of the courts not to acknowledge this norm as a binding
one. Using often circuitous reasoning, U.S. courts have successfully refrained
from finding an obligation of the Executive branch to act in accordance with
these norms.
The insistence of domestic courts that the principle of non-refoulement as
contained in the Protocol is not self-executing, provides further evidence of
their disregard of this principle. One author formulated that “[t]he tendency to
find Article 33’s clear, mandatory command to be domestically unenforceable
in the absence of identically worded implementing legislation is yet another
symptom of the courts’ general disregard of international law, especially where
individuals seek its protection against law-breaking conduct of U.S.
officials.”133 As a norm or otherwise, courts balk at recognizing an obligation
of non-refoulement.
The problem often encountered in the course of trying to prove customary
international law to a court has been referred to as the “blank stare
phenomenon.”134 Such a label is not meant to be condescending, but is more
likely “owing to judges’ typical unfamiliarity with and resistance to
international standards.”135
Indeed, as practice has proven, “judicial
skepticism is one of the largest obstacles for a lawyer trying to use customary
law in domestic litigation.”136 While a certain degree of judicial hesitancy is
understandable, especially in cases involving such a political “hot potato” as
immigration.137 However, when addressing situations such as the admissibility

132. “When international law protects individual rights against governments, then
enforcement of international law falls squarely within the traditional notion of judicial
responsibility.” Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100
YALE L.J. 2277, 2308 (1991).
133. Joan Fitzpatrick, The International Dimension of U.S. Refugee Law. 15 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 1, 10 (1997).
134. Paul L. Hoffman, Problems of Proving International Human Rights Law in U.S. Courts:
The “Blank Stare Phenomenon”: Proving Customary International Law in U.S. Courts, 25 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 181 (1996).
135. Fitzpatrick, supra note 133, at 24.
136. Hoffman, supra note 134, at 181.
137. “U.S. courts will almost always be reluctant to impose onerous duties on the other
branches of government in [refugee and immigration issues], especially if it entails granting
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of refugees, whose lives often hang in the balance, “[t]he mandate of U.S.
courts to protect the human rights of aliens and refugees would seem to be
clear.”138 In light of the fact that courts have repeatedly failed to do so,
however, “the pursuit of political strategies may be a more effective way of
encouraging compliance with international refugee norms than expending the
bulk of one’s energies in court.”139
The administration of even straightforward regulations has presented
problems for the I.N.S. It is perhaps too much to expect then, that any test
developed by a court could be applied by officials of the same agency with any
more success. The lack of judicial review provided for in IIRIRA, coupled
with the dim prospect of the development of standards that would be helpful in
bringing U.S. law into line with international norms, leads this author to
conclude that statutory reform may well be the only hope for the preservation
of refugee protection in the U.S.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In light of the totality of the restrictions placed upon admission to the U.S.
by IIRIRA, there is no room to allow for any limitation upon the fundamental
principle of non-refoulement. The expedited removal procedures instituted by
IIRIRA are a threat to asylum seekers, as they limit access to the very
mechanism that is designed to offer protection to asylum seekers. What is now
lacking is similar protection of the principle of non-refoulement. The attempts
of the I.N.S. to implement regulations in an effort to compensate for IIRIRA’s
failure to guarantee such protections have proven to be inadequate. It is, of
course, the untold consequences of this action that belie its severity as to:
refugees and other aliens, the destruction of the ordinary checks of publicity
and review provides dangerous opportunities for arbitrary behavior. The
absence of any evidence that this innovation was needed makes its imposition
all the more regrettable.140

The conclusion that the procedures created by IIRIRA “appear susceptible
of fair application meeting the international standards”141 may not be entirely
untrue. However, until such time as there is no longer a possibility of these
procedures being applied in a manner that contravenes the requirements of

admission to or permanent status in the United States.” Scott Busby, The Politics of Protection:
Limits and Possibilities in the Implementation of International Refugee Norms in the United
States, 15 BERK. J. INT’L LAW 27, 35 (1997).
138. Arthur C. Helton, The Mandate of U.S. Courts to Protect Aliens and Refugees Under
International Human Rights Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2335, 2345 (1991).
139. Busby, supra note 136, at 37.
140. Gerald L. Newman, Admissions and Denials: A Dialogic Introduction to the
Immigration Law Symposium, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1395, 1401 (1997).
141. Cooper, supra note91, at 1524.
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international refugee law, the U.S. continues to breach the duty it owes to
refugees. The manner in which the I.N.S. has implemented the process of
expedited removal shows little promise for a consistent and compliant
application of IIRIRA. The continued denial by the I.N.S. of access and data
regarding the expedited removal process “continues to insulate [it] from
careful scrutiny and evaluation.”142 This denial of access has deprived human
rights advocates of the information necessary to ensure appropriate reform of
the expedited removal process. Absent a statutory mandate that would
introduce safeguards for refugees into the expedited removal process, the U.S.
will continue to “[imperil] bona fide refugees.”143 As long as expedited
removal continues to place refugees at risk, it is not easy to foresee how the
U.S. could be found to be in compliance with international norms of refugee
protection against refoulement.
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